We study decentralized college admissions in the face of uncertain student preferences. Enrollment uncertainty causes colleges to strategically target their admissions to those students likely to be overlooked by their competitors. Consequently, highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or suffer from a higher chance of coming up empty-"falling through the cracks"-than those ranked below. When students' attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weights on school-specific measures such as essays and extracurricular activities. Restricting the number of applications or wait-listing alleviates enrollment uncertainty, but the outcomes are inefficient and unfair. A centralized matching via Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm attains efficiency and fairness, but some college may be worse off relative to decentralized matching.
Introduction
Centralized matching has gained prominence in economic theory and practice, spurred by successful applications such as medical residency matching and public school choice. Yet, many matching markets remain decentralized; college and graduate school admissions are notable examples. It is often suggested that these markets do not operate well and will therefore benefit from improved coordination or complete centralization, but it is not well understood why they remain decentralized and what welfare benefits would be gained by improved coordination. At least part of the problem is the lack of an analytical grasp of decentralized matching markets. A seminal work by Roth and Xing (1997) attributes the problems of such markets to "congestion"-participants are not allowed to make enough offers and acceptances to clear the markets. But, its analytical content, namely the equilibrium and welfare implications of congestion, remains poorly understood. Indeed, we have yet to develop a workhorse model of decentralized matching that can serve as a useful benchmark for comparison with a centralized system.
The current paper develops an analytical framework for understanding decentralized matching markets in the context of college admissions. College admissions in countries such as Japan, Korea and the US are organized similarly to decentralized labor markets: colleges make exploding and binding admission offers to applicants, and the admitted students accept or reject the offers, often within a short window of time. This process provides little opportunity for colleges to learn students' preferences and adjust their admissions decisions accordingly. Consequently, they often end up enrolling too many or too few students relative to their capacities. For instance, 1,415 freshmen accepted Yale's invitation to join its incoming class in 1995-96, although the university had aimed for a class of 1,335. At the same year, Princeton also reported 1,100 entering students, the largest in its history. The college had to set up mobile homes in fields and build new dorms to accommodate the students (Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser, 2003) . These mistakes are costly for the colleges.
1
Controlling yield is particularly challenging for colleges in Korea, since students apply for a department, instead of a college, and each department faces a relatively rigid and low quota.
2 The challenge is not much easier for US counterparts. Applications to US colleges have grown dramatically in recent years, largely due to the introduction of the Common Application-the online platform that allows students to apply to many colleges at negligible costs.
3 As a consequence, the average yield rate of four-year colleges in the US has declined significantly over the past decade, from 49% in 2001 to 38% in 2011 (National Association for College Admission Counseling, 2012, NACAC hereafter). 4 The declining rates resulted
1 The cost may also take the form of an explicit penalty imposed on the admitting unit (e.g., department) by the government (as in Korea) or by the college (as in Australia).
2 The departments that exceed pre-specified capacity are subject to a rather harsh penalty by the government in the form of a sharply reduced capacities in the subsequent year.
3 The average number of applications per institution increased 60% between 2002 and 2011, and 79% of Fall 2011 freshmen applied to three or more colleges, with 29% of them submitting seven or more applications (NACAC, 2012) .
4 NACAC reports the State of College Admission for each year since 2002, based on data sets including in increased uncertainty for colleges-a main theme in the NACAC (2012) report on the current state of US college admissions.
5
Importantly, the enrollment uncertainty a college faces is endogenous, depending on the admissions decisions made by other colleges. A student admitted by a college poses a greater uncertainty for its enrollment when the student is also admitted by other colleges, since her enrollment depends on the student's (unknown) preference. This interdependent nature of uncertainty introduces a novel strategic interaction among colleges in their admissions decisions. In this paper, we develop a model that captures this feature.
In our model, there are two colleges, each with limited capacity, and a unit mass of students. Colleges consider several measures of a student's merit: a student's "score" which is common across colleges (e.g., high school grade point average (GPA) or Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores) and his/her college-specific measures, which are independent across colleges (e.g., college-specific essays/exams or extracurricular activities). Students apply to colleges at no cost. Each college ranks students according to their score and its specific measure, but it does not know students' preferences toward them. This uncertainty takes an aggregate form: the mass of students preferring one college over the other varies with unknown states of nature (in particular, unknown to colleges). Each college incurs a constant (marginal) cost for enrollment exceeding its capacity. Our model involves a simple time-line: Initially, students simultaneously apply to colleges. Each college observes only the scores of those students who apply to it. Then, the two colleges simultaneously offer admissions to sets of students. Finally, students decide on which offer (if any) to accept.
Given that application is costless, students have a (weakly) dominant strategy of applying to both colleges. Hence, the focus of the analysis is the colleges' admissions decisions. Our main finding is that colleges respond to congestion strategically by employing measures that would avoid head-on competition. Specifically, when the colleges do not value noncommon measures significantly, they may strategically target their admissions based on the common measure of merit, to those likely to be overlooked by the competitor. Strategic targeting results in an equilibrium that does not have a simple cutoff structure suggested in the existing research, and the effects on the students are non-monotonic with respect to their scores. Students with higher scores may receive admissions from fewer colleges or they may suffer from a higher chance of not being admitted by any (i.e., "falling through the cracks"), compared to students with lower scores. When the colleges value both common and non-common measures of student qualities, they avoid head-on competition by biasing their admissions in favor of those who score highly in non-common/college-specific measures against those who score highly in the common measure. The outcome of the equilibrium in both cases is inefficient since at least some colleges leave their seats unfilled despite there being some unmatched students that the college would have been happy to admit. Strategic targeting and biased admissions make the outcome also unfair, in the sense of creating "justified envy": a mass of students are unable to enroll at their favorite college even though the college enrolls students it ranks below them.
6
In practice, colleges employ additional measures to cope with congestion. One is to restrict the number of applications a student can submit, as practiced by some US colleges in Early Admissions and through other formats elsewhere. Another is for colleges to admit students in sequence, or "wait-listing." While these additional measures reduce the uncertainty colleges face in enrollment, we show that they do not eliminate strategic responses from participants and undesirable welfare and fairness problems. The most comprehensive response would be to centralize the matching via a clearinghouse. We show that, at least when colleges value only a common measure, centralized matching using Gale and Shapley's Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA in short) eliminates colleges' yield control and justified envy problems, and it attains efficiency. However, it is possible for some colleges to be worse off relative to the decentralized matching. This may explain a possible lack of consensus toward centralization and the prevalence of decentralized matching in many countries.
Several papers in the matching literature have studied decentralized matching markets. Roth and Xing (1997) focus on the entry-level market for clinical psychologists in which firms make offers to workers sequentially and workers can either accept, reject, or hold the offers, and the process repeats over the course of a day. They find, mainly based on simulations, that such a decentralized (but coordinated) market exhibits congestion, and the resulting outcome is unstable.
7 The current work provides an analytical content to congestion by studying participants' strategic responses and their implications for welfare and fairness. The college admissions problem has recently received attention in the economics literature. Chade and Smith (2006) study students' application decision as a portfolio choice problem. In Chade, Lewis and Smith (forthcoming), students with heterogeneous abilities 6 Our result works for finite agents without aggregate uncertainty. See the example in Section 1.2 in our working paper version (Che and Koh, 2014) . We use aggregate uncertainty to capture congestion in a large market model.
7 See also Neiderle and Yariv (2009) , which provides a condition for a decentralized one-to-one matching with sequential offers to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium, and Coles, Kushnir and Neiderle (2013) , which shows how introducing a signaling device in a decentralized matching market alleviates congestion. make application decisions subject to application costs, and colleges set admission standards based on noisy signals of students' abilities. Avery and Levin (2010) and Lee (2009) study early admissions. 8 Unlike our model, colleges face no enrollment uncertainty in these models. Independently of the current paper, Hafalir et al. (2014) study decentralized college admissions with restricted applications, both theoretically and experimentally. Their focus is on student efforts, not on the colleges' response to congestion. Avery, Lee and Roth (2014) and Chen and Kao (2014a,b) study features of Korean and Taiwanese colleges admissions, respectively, that limit students' applications. Their focus is on the strategic decisions by colleges to gain competitive strength, whereas ours is on the implications of the strategic burden these practices will place on students. Our model is also related to political lobbying behavior studied by Persico (2001, 2005) . Just as colleges target students in our model, politicians in these models target voters in distributing their favors.
9 Our model also shares some similarities with directed search models, such as Montgomery (1991) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) . In these models, workers engage in directed searches, but their inability to coordinate their job applications causes "search friction." Like the workers in these models, colleges in our model engage in "directed searches" over students. The main differences are that colleges offer admissions to many (in fact, a continuum of) students with heterogeneous qualities subject to aggregate uncertainty. This leads to strategic targeting, a novel feature in our model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibria and explores their welfare and fairness implications. Restriction of applications, wait-lisitng and centralization via DA are then discussed in Section 4. Section 5 collects empirical evidence on the relevance of enrollment uncertainty and the main theoretical predictions. Section 6 offers further implications of our findings. Proofs are provided in Appendix A unless stated otherwise.
Model
There are two colleges A and B, each with capacity κ < 1 2
, and there is a unit mass of students with type (v, e A , e B ) ∈ V × E A × E B ≡ [0, 1] 3 , where v is a student's academic performance measure commonly considered by both colleges, and e A and e B are college-8 Early admissions serve as a tool to identify enthusiastic applicants in Avery and Levin (2010) and to avoid "winner's curse" in Lee (2009) . See also Chade (2006) , which studies "acceptance curse" in matching when signals of partners' (common-value) qualities are noisy.
9 Voters are homogeneous in their model, whereas students in our model have heterogeneous abilities and preferences. This heterogeneity leads colleges to choose differing admission rates for different student types. More importantly, aggregate uncertainty plays a unique role in our model, whereas the rule of splitting the spoils of office (winner-take-all versus proportional rule) matters in their model. specific measures considered respectively by colleges A and B. One interpretation is that v is a student's test score on a nationwide exam, and e A and e B are the student's performances on college-specific essays or tests. Alternatively, v can be an academic performance measure observed by both colleges, while e i corresponds to an extracurricular activity observed by college i = A, B. We assume that v is distributed according to a continuous distribution G(·) with a smooth density function g(·), and that e A and e B are independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
10
Students' preferences for colleges involve aggregate uncertainty: a state s is drawn (without loss) uniformly from [0, 1] , such that each student prefers A with probability µ A (s) and B with probability µ B (s) := 1 − µ A (s).
11 The probability µ A (s) is strictly increasing and continuous in state s, so a higher state corresponds to college A being more popular. College i's payoff from matriculating a student of type (v, e i ) is denoted by U i (v, e i ). The payoff function is strictly increasing in v and nondecreasing in e i . We further assume that U i is differentiable in (v, e i ). Each college faces a marginal cost λ ≥ max i=A,B U i (1, 1) for enrollment exceeding its quota. One special case of interest is that colleges value only the common measure; i.e., U i (v, ·) ≡ v, in which case the role of e i is to break ties for students. Clearly, this serves as a useful benchmark for understanding congestion in the simplest form. In practice, e i can matter in varying degrees. Colleges may admit students based on the score of a single nationwide test, as in Australia and Turkey, or they may consider multiple dimensions of students' attributes and performances, academic and non-academic, as in the US.
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The timing of the game is as follows. First, nature draws state s (i.e., aggregate uncertainty is realized). Next, all students simultaneously apply to colleges. College i = A, B only observes (v, e i ) of those students who apply to it, and colleges simultaneously decide which applicants to admit. Lastly, students accept or reject their offers. We assume that students face no application costs, which makes it weakly dominant for them to apply to both colleges.
13 Throughout, we focus on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which students play the weakly dominant strategy. Colleges make admission offers based on the observed student types. College i's strategy 10 The uniform distribution assumption is without loss, since e i can be seen as a relabeling of the intrinsic performance measure, say e i , by its "quantile:" e i = X i (e i ), where X i is a cdf of e i . In fact, we can allow for positive correlation of e i and v, via first-order stochastic dominance relation. We have chosen a simpler formulation to avoid clutter.
11 Again, the uniform distribution is without loss, because s can be seen as a relabeling of the true "state," say s , by its quantile s := F (s ).
12 For instance, students' community service or leadership activities may weigh heavily for some colleges, whereas extracurricular activities such as musical or athletic talents may be important for others.
13 The strategy of applying to both colleges can be made strictly dominant if students have some uncertainty about their types, which is realistic in the case that the types are not publicly observable or the case that the weighting of each dimension of types is unknown to the students. is a mapping σ i : V × E i → [0, 1], which specifies a fraction σ i (v, e i ) of admitted students with type (v, e i ). For given (σ A , σ B ), the mass of students enrolling in college i in state s is
represents the fraction of type v students college i admits. In words, a fraction σ i (v)(1 − σ j (v)) of students is admitted only by college i, and a fraction σ i (v)σ j (v) is admitted by both colleges, for i, j = A, B, i = j. All students in the former group accept i's admissions, but only a fraction µ i (s) of the latter group accepts i's offer in state s. single-crossing College i's ex ante payoff consists of the aggregate utility of enrolling students and the capacity cost associated with excess enrollment:
Note that the under-enrollment is also costly. Leaving a seat unfilled incurs the opportunity cost of not enrolling some students with (v, e i ). An immediate observation is that each college's payoff is concave in its own admission strategy; that is, 3 | σ i (v, e i ) > 0} be the types of students admitted by college i, and U AB := U A ∩ U B be the types of students admitted by both colleges in that equilibrium.
In what follows, we shall focus on equilibria in which U AB has positive measure. In an equilibrium with zero measure of U AB , colleges coordinate perfectly to avoid competition, which seems unrealistic in practice; such an equilibrium can also be easily ruled out if colleges value students with high v or high e i sufficiently highly.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium in which U AB has a positive measure, m A (0) < κ < m A (1) and m B (1) < κ < m B (0). Moreover, there exists a uniqueŝ i ∈ (0, 1) such that m i (ŝ i ) = κ for all i = A, B, and the measure of U A ∪ U B is strictly smaller than 1.
Proof. The proof is in the Supplementary Notes.
According to the lemma, in equilibrium, colleges cannot have strict over-enrollment for all states or strict under-enrollment for all states. Over-enrolling in all states is clearly unprofitable for a college since it could save λ by rejecting some students; likewise, underenrolling in all states is also not optimal, since accepting additional students would raise its payoff without violating its quota. In particular, each college will suffer from underenrollment in some states and over-enrollment in other states. This is intuitive since given (aggregately) uncertain preferences of students, the presence of students receiving admissions from both colleges creates non-trivial enrollment uncertainty. Each college then manages the uncertainty by optimally trading off the cost of over-enrollment in high demand states with that of under-enrollment in low demand states. The last part of the lemma means that in equilibrium, there is a positive measure of students who do not receive admission from either college.
Characterization of Equilibria
We now analyze colleges' admission decisions in equilibrium with a positive measure of U AB . As noted in Lemma 1, there exist cutoff states (ŝ A ,ŝ B ) such that colleges A and B over-enroll in states S A := {s|s ≥ŝ A } and S B := {s|s ≤ŝ B }, respectively. Rewrite college i's payoff as follows:
The first part of Lemma 2 shows that the signs of (H A , H B ) are sufficient statistics for characterizing equilibria. Since this condition only ensures "local" incentive compatibility, there is a concern that a college may profitably deviate "globally" by changing its admission decisions on a mass of students. The lemma assures that no such global deviation is profitable. Hence, a strategy profile satisfying local incentives is indeed an equilibrium. The single-crossing property reveals the nature of strategic interaction. In particular, it suggests that a student more likely to be admitted by its competitor is less desirable for a given college, all else equal. This point warrants a careful examination. To this end, recall first that H i (v, e i , σ j (v)) is nondecreasing in e i . This, together with (the first part of)
Lemma 2, allows us to restrict attention to a cutoffê i (v): college i admits student type (v, e i ) if and only if e i ≥ê i (v). Given this, σ j (v) = 1 −ê j (v), so we can equivalently focus on
where u i := λ Prob(s ∈ S i ) is the capacity cost college i incurs when a student without an offer from college j accepts its admission, and
is its cost when a student with an offer from j accepts its admission. Recall that a college incurs capacity cost only when it over-enrolls. If the student does not receive an offer from college j, then she accepts i's admission for sure. Hence, over-enrollment occurs with probability Prob(s ∈ S i ), explaining the marginal cost of u i . However, if the student receives an offer from college j, she accepts i's offer only when she prefers i to j. Hence, conditional on acceptance, college i over-enrolls with probability Prob(s ∈ S i ) , which explains the marginal cost u i . A key observation is that u i > u i . This is because while students without an offer from its competitor accept a college's offer independently of the state, students with an offer from its competitor are more likely to accept a college's offer when it is more popular. Since a college is more likely to over-enroll when it is popular, admitting the latter students is more costly. It is important to note that a student's uncertain preference per se is not the source of this cost; a college can fully hedge idiosyncratic preferences uncertainty in a large market. The reason why it disfavors such a student is because of the "incidence" of the student's acceptance: given the aggregate uncertainty, the acceptance by students with competing admissions is more concentrated on the over-enrollment state. For this reason, colleges in our model seek high-yield students.
(b) U i depends both on v and e i Figure 3 .1: College i's Admission Decision student of a given score v increases, so its cutoff falls, when its opponent raises its cutoff. Consequently, the game facing the colleges is that of strategic substitutability. To gain further understanding, for college i = A, B and for each v ∈ V, define i's upper and lower cutoffs:
which are depicted in Figure 3 .1. The left and right panels respectively describe the case that the colleges only value the common measure (i.e., U i (v, e i ) ≡ v) and the case that they also value their non-common measures. The students with (v, e i ) above the upper cutoff are worth admitting even when the opponent college employsê j (v) = 0 (i.e., j admits all type-v students); surely, it is optimal for college i to admit such students. Likewise, the students below the lower cutoff give negative marginal payoff even when they receive no offers from j; surely, it is optimal for college i to reject them. Inspection of H i reveals that these two cutoffs correspond to indifference curves,
The real cutoffê i (·) must lie between the two cutoffs, in the "gray zone" in Figure 3 .1. The equilibrium cutoffs are characterized more precisely in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. An equilibrium is characterized by a profile of cutoff functions
each of which lies between the upper and lower cutoffs for the respective college, wherê
(and is equal to one when the set is empty). 
The first part of Theorem 1 suggests that the equilibrium is characterized via an intersection of colleges' "best responses" in their choice of cutoffs: for each v,ê A (v) is chosen as a best response againstê B (v) and vice versa. Figure 3 .2 depicts the best responses for a fixed v that corresponds to the "gray zone" for both colleges.
Strategic substitutability means that the best response curves are (weakly) negatively sloped. Depending on the importance of the non-common measures, however, the strategic interaction can vary dramatically. The left panel depicts the case in which the colleges only value the common measure (i.e., U i (v, e i ) ≡ v). One response could be perfect targeting;
one college admits the students and the other rejects them (either corner). They may also coordinate by "mixing"-or selecting an interior fraction of students,-by using the non-common measure as a randomization device. Colleges playing this latter strategy will appear to value the non-common measures even though they are of no intrinsic value to them. The right panel depicts the case in which colleges value their non-common measures highly. Since a high value of non-common measure does not indicate high enrollment uncertainty, the strategic link between the colleges weakens, so the best-response curves are relatively flat, and a unique (and interior) intersection (ê * i ,ê * j ) obtains. Ultimately, one is interested in how the cutoffs (ê A (v),ê B (v)) vary with v. An interesting question is whetherê i (v) is decreasing in v in equilibrium, which would imply that the equilibrium admissions policy is monotonic: if college i admits a type-(v, e i ) student, then it must also admit a type-(v , e i ) student, provided (v , e i ) ≥ (v, e i ). Our equilibrium does not guarantee such a monotonicity; the reason is that, while
) need not; namely, the strategic response by the opponent can give rise to a non-monotonic reaction. Indeed, non-monotonicities may arise in equilibrium when the colleges primarily value the common measure, as will be seen below. Even when the admission policies are monotonic, the colleges do not admit students according to their intrinsic preferences. Indeed, the second part of Theorem 1 reveals that colleges would systematically distort the admissions criteria to favor those students who score highly in non-common measure at the expense of those who score highly in the common measure. The "overweighting" of the non-common measure is seen formally by the fact that the slope of the cutoff curveê i (·) is less than that of the indifference curve, i.e., the college's true marginal rate of substitution of v for e i .
More precise understanding of the equilibrium can be gained by focusing on two special cases, to which we now turn.
Colleges only value the common measure. As mentioned, in this case, colleges may strategically target or mix over the students in the gray zone. We focus on the equilibrium in which colleges mix over the students using their non-common measures as randomization devices. More precisely, in a mixing equilibrium, they choose (
18 Such an equilibrium always exists, as will be shown below.
19
The example depicted in Figure 3 .3 shows equilibrium admissions strategies when college A is slightly more popular than college B. In line with Figure 3 .1(a), both upper and lower cutoffs are step functions, indexed by their vertical segments. Interestingly, the vertical segments are not aligned between the two colleges. The figure shows, rather intuitively, that college A is more "selective" than college B with respect to both upper and lower cutoffs (.75 and .54 respectively for college A, versus .71 and .42 respectively for college B). This misalignment of the cutoffs gives rise to a "trough" in A's admissions policy (for v ∈ [0.71, 0.75]) and a "ridge" in B's admissions policy (for v ∈ [.42, .54]). The "trough" corresponds to the students that B is committed to admit, irrespective of A's decision (i.e., above B's upper cutoff), so the optimal response by A is to "shun" them altogether, 18 Since the upper and lower cutoffs are endogenous, it is a priori unclear if this gray zone would be nonempty in equilibrium. Hence, the condition is the equilibrium selection property. Theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition for the gray zone to appear in equilibrium.
19 There may exist another equilibrium in which colleges target students perfectly based on v, as depicted by a corner intersection in Figure 3 .2(a). Such an equilibrium requires a great deal of coordination between colleges that may be implausible, whereas the "mixing" equilibrium is more "anonymous" in the way the colleges treat different v types. The welfare and fairness implications we report in Theorem 4 also apply to this perfect coordinating equilibrium, however. although A admits some students with lower v. The "ridge" corresponds to the group of students A is certain to reject, which makes them attractive enough for B to admit fully; this is in contrast to B's "harsh" treatment of the students with slightly higher v. These features bring about "non-monotonicity" in the colleges' admissions decisions. In particular, the "harsh" treatment by B of students with v just above 0.54 corresponds to the classical "fall-through-the-cracks" phenomenon whereby good students are neglected by a weaker college for fear that a stronger college may admit them. Indeed, the students just above the ridge (≈ .54) have discontinuously lower chance of getting any offer than the students just below, precisely because former students are appealing enough to attract admission from the stronger college with some chance! Conforming to the second part of Theorem 1, the cutoffs in the gray zone are flatter than the indifference curve (which should be vertical), meaning that colleges "appear" to value non-common measures despite their being of no intrinsic value to them. The presence of this gray zone distinguishes our equilibrium from the characterization in the existing literature, where colleges employ cutoff strategies (Avery and Levin, 2010; Chade, Lewis and Smith, forthcoming) . The main source of the difference, as noted earlier, is the presence of enrollment uncertainty in our model. We show below that the presence of the gray zone-or the lack of cutoff equilibrium structure-is a general feature when colleges are sufficiently symmetric.
Theorem 2. There exists a mixing equilibrium in which colleges choose interior cutoffs
2 that are strictly decreasing in v for any v ∈ (max i=A,B u i , min i=A,B u i ).
This latter "mixing" interval is nonempty, provided that colleges are ex ante sufficiently symmetric; formally, if
for all s and for some ε > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Although the result is not limited to symmetric equilibria, the intuition can be seen more clearly when we focus on symmetric equilibria (in the case that colleges are symmetric). Suppose to the contrary that both colleges adopt cutoff strategies using the same cutoff v. Namely, they compete for students of types [v, 1] . Suppose that a college deviates by shifting its admissions from students of types [v, v + ε) to types [v − ε , v) . Note that the former students receive a competing offer, thus entailing uncertainty in enrollment, while the latter do not. For small enough ε and ε , chosen to keep the expected yield unchanged, the resulting drop in the quality of the admission pool is negligible but the benefit in reducing the uncertainty is of first order importance. Hence, the (symmetric) cutoff equilibrium cannot be sustained.
Colleges value the non-common measures significantly. In this case, colleges' preferences are sufficiently independent, so their incentive to strategically target students based on the common measure v is not very strong. Hence, the equilibrium admissions strategies are now likely to exhibit monotonicity. However, as stated in Theorem 1, the yield management consideration will still cause them to bias their admissions policies in favor of students with high non-common measures.
To state the result formally, we assume that there exists δ > 0 such that
for all (v, e i , e j ) ∈ (0, 1) 3 , where i, j = A, B and i = j. 20 We further assume that
where
This condition implies that colleges value non-common measures sufficiently highly, relative to the common measure.
20 This assumption is made only because we assume U Theorem 3. Given (3.2), an equilibrium exists, and in any equilibrium, college i's cutof e i (v) is nonincreasing in v everywhere and strictly decreasing in v wheneverê i (v) ∈ (0, 1).
In particular, there existsv < 1 such that for all v >v, (ê A (v),ê B (v)) are strictly decreasing in v. The colleges overweight non-common measures in the sense of (3.1) for v >v.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
Welfare and Fairness
We have seen that colleges respond to enrollment uncertainty by strategically targeting students or by distorting their admissions criteria in favor of non-common measures (even when they do not intrinsically value them). We now explore the implications of this behavior for welfare and fairness. For each state s, an assignment is a mapping from a student type V × E A × E B into a college {A, B, ø}, where ø denotes the "null" college. An outcome is a mapping from a state to an assignment, i.e., the realized allocation in state s. Welfare and fairness can be defined based on the colleges' and the students' (ordinal) preferences. We say that a student has justified envy at state s if at that state she prefers a college to the one that enrolls her, even though the former college enrolls a student it ranks below her according to its true preference. An outcome is said to be fair if for almost all states, the assignment it selects causes no justified envy for almost all students. An outcome is Pareto efficient if the associated assignment is Pareto undominated for almost every state-namely, there is no other assignment in which both colleges and all students are weakly better off and at least one college or a positive measure of students is strictly better off.
Theorem 4. In any equilibrium of a decentralized matching (in which U AB has positive measure), the allocation is Pareto inefficient. The outcome is also unfair if for at least one college i = A, B, its admission cutoffê i (v) is interior and its opponent's cutoffê j (v), j = i, is strictly decreasing in v for v ∈ (v , v ).
Proof. The first statement follows directly from Lemma 1, according to which there exists (ŝ A ,ŝ B ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 such that college A over-enrolls for s >ŝ A and college B under-enrolls for s >ŝ B . Hence, for s > max{ŝ A ,ŝ B }, a positive measure of unmatched students can fill vacancies that exist at college B, without altering the matching of the other students. This reassignment Pareto dominates the equilibrium outcome.
To prove the latter claim, supposeê i (v) ∈ (0, 1) andê j (v) is strictly decreasing in v for an interval (v , v ) . By the second part of Theorem 1, we have
. This means that one can find two sets of students X,X ⊂ (v , v ) × E i and u such that, for all (v, e) ∈ X, e >ê i (v) and U i (e, v) < u, and for all (ṽ,ẽ) ∈X,ẽ <ê i (ṽ) and
(In Figure 3 .4, X can be found in region I, at the top between solid and dotted lines, and X can be found in region II, at the bottom between dotted and solid lines). Clearly, the students inX have justified envy toward students in X. Since the justified envy exists for a positive measure of students for all states, the outcome is unfair.
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 give sufficient conditions for the outcome to be unfair.
Corollary 1. The outcome is unfair in any equilibrium given (3.2) or in the mixing equilibrium of the one dimensional model if the colleges are sufficiently symmetric.
Different Responses to Enrollment Uncertainty
In this section, we study additional measures that colleges may employ to manage their enrollment. Addressing these measures in full generality goes beyond the scope of the current paper. Instead, we develop relevant insights based on the simple environment in which colleges only value the common measure v.
Restricted Applications
One common method colleges employ is to limit the number of applications that students can submit. The restriction may be coordinated by colleges, or even institutionalized, as in the UK, Korea and Japan. 21 It may also be a result of colleges' unilateral actions, as with the "single-choice" requirement some US colleges place in their early admissions plans, 22 or with the synchronized scheduling of on-site entrance exams by colleges in Korea and Japan.
23
Restricting applications eases colleges' burden of managing uncertainty in enrollment; yield rates rise because applicants have fewer choices and students are forced to become more credible with their choices. Consequently, colleges face fewer incentives to act strategically. With two colleges in our model, for instance, limiting students to apply to one would eliminate the uncertainty since students will never reject an admission. Thus, colleges will meet their targets exactly by simply admitting students above an appropriately-chosen cutoff. At the same time, the students will be forced to act strategically with their applications. In a nutshell, this method shifts the strategic burden from colleges to students.
To illustrate its implications, consider our baseline model with only common measure v. To understand the strategic problem of students, we introduce cardinal preferences: each student draws a payoff y ∈ [0, 1] from attending college A and 1 − y from attending B. Suppose that there are two equally-likely states a and b, and that y is drawn according to the CDFs K(y|a) = y 2 and K(y|b) = y, in the two states. This assumption ensures that college A is more popular overall and relatively more popular in state a than in state b. For simplicity, suppose each student knows her preference y but not her score v at the time of application. of students who applied to the two colleges and are admitted by them. In the equilibrium, the colleges act nonstrategically, admitting students above a cutoff that fills their capacities in each state. By contrast, students apply "strategically": they now apply to A if y >ŷ := 0.55 and to B if y <ŷ. Importantly, those with y ∈ [0.5, 0.55] apply 21 Students cannot apply to both Cambridge and Oxford in the UK, and applicants in Japan can apply to at most two public universities. Korean colleges (more precisely, college-department pairs) are partitioned into three groups, and students are allowed to apply to only one in each group.
22 Early admissions consist of Early Decision, which requires students to enroll if admitted, and Early Action, which does not involve such commitment. While pursuing admission under an Early Decision plan, students may apply to other institutions, but may have only one Early Decision application pending at any time (NACAC, 2012) . Some Early Action plans place restrictions on student applications to other early plans. Selective universities such as Harvard, Stanford, Yale and Princeton restricted applicants to a single private university in their 2014 Early Action plans.
23 The Korean government has offered several dates, and many Korean universities have voluntarily chosen to schedule their exam on the same date. See Avery, Lee and Roth (2014) about the colleges' strategic scheduling problem in such an environment. Public universities in Japan coordinate on three dates for on-site entrance exams.
24 This does not alter our analysis for the baseline model. Nonobservability of scores by students makes it a strictly dominant strategy for students to apply to both colleges. Hence, the previous analyses still remain valid with this assumption. In reality, even though students submit their records to colleges, they do not know precisely how they are ranked by colleges. See Avery and Levin (2010) for the same treatment.
25 The features of the equilibrium hold more generally. A full analysis of the equilibrium is provided in Che and Koh (2014) and is also included in the Supplementary Notes. to B despite the fact that they prefer A to B. This is because of the overall popularity of A, which causes these students to sacrifice their moderate preference for A so as to increase the odds of getting admitted by any college.
One can see that the shifting of strategic burden from colleges to students does not eliminate the fairness and welfare problems of congestion. First, the equilibrium is unfair. . Second, the equilibrium is inefficient. In state a, only mass 0.3 of students apply to B, leaving its capacity κ = 0.4 unfilled. This outcome is inefficient because some students are unmatched even though they are acceptable to B in that state.
Sequential Admissions: Wait-listing
Colleges also manage enrollment uncertainty by offering admissions sequentially. According to this method, a college admits some applicants and wait-list others in the first round. Later it admits students from the wait list when some offers are rejected. This process may repeat for several rounds. Most colleges in France and Korea use wait lists. In the US, nearly 45% of four-year colleges adopted wait lists in 2011 , up from 32% in 2002 (NACAC, 2012 . Typically, admissions in each round are not deferred and/or the number of iterations is limited. Hence, even though wait-listing allows for more admission offers and acceptances than the baseline model, it does not fully eliminate congestion. For this reason, strategic targeting remains an issue.
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This point can be seen by a simple extension of our baseline model. There are three colleges, A, B and C, each with a mass κ < 1 3 capacity. Colleges again evaluate students based only on their common score v, as before. All students prefer A and B to C, but C is significantly better than not attending any school. A college's utility is given by students' scores, but for each student, there is a probability ε ∈ (0, 1) that each of colleges A and B finds the student unacceptable. College C admits students simply based on their scores.
There are two equally-likely states, a and b. In state j ∈ {a, b}, a fraction s j of students gets utility u from A and u < u from B, and the remaining 1 − s j students have the opposite preference, where
. (In other words, college i is more popular in state s i , i = A, B, and the two colleges are ex ante symmetric in popularity.) In either state, a student gets utility u from C, where (1 − ε)u < u < u, so having C with certainty is better than having the more preferred of the two other colleges with probability 1 − ε. In additions, suppose that λ is so high that a college never admits more than κ in total. Consider the following model of wait-listing: in each round, each college admits a set of students and waitlists the remaining applicants. A student who has received an offer must accept or reject it immediately. After the first round, colleges A and B learn the state, so the game effectively ends in two rounds.
We show that there is no symmetric equilibrium in which both colleges A and B use a cutoff strategy (i.e., admit the top κ acceptable students) in the first round.
Theorem 5. There is no symmetric equilibrium in which both colleges A and B offer admissions to the top κ acceptable students in the first round.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose A and B admit the best candidates up to their capacities while keeping the next best group in mind in case some offers are turned down. The problem with this strategy is that when some of those admitted turn down their offers, the next-best students the colleges have in mind may not be available, since these students, uncertain about whether A or B would find them acceptable, may have accepted an offer from C. This implies that the students who remain after the first round are likely to be far worse than the next-best group. Hence, a college would deviate profitably by skipping over some of the top κ students and preemptively admitting some of the second-best students. Theorem 5 implies that strategic targeting-i.e., a non-cutoff equilibrium-must occur in any gestion (Roth and Xing (1997) ). Korean college admissions involve many rounds, but nontrivial congestion appears to exist, as we show below (See Section 5). Another measure of congestion is the number of "repeat applicants"-the applicants who are either unmatched or refuse to accept their assignments and wait one full year to take another "crack" at the assignment process. That number reached 127,000 in Korea in 2014. While much of the problem may be solved by "frictionless aftermarket," what form the market should take is far from clear. 
Centralized Matching via Deferred Acceptance
The most systemic response to enrollment uncertainty is to centralize the admissions via a clearinghouse. College admissions are centralized in countries such as Australia, China, Germany, Taiwan, Turkey and the UK. While a number of matching algorithms may be used for this purpose, one popular method is Gale and Shapley's Deferred Acceptance algorithm (henceforth DA). Not only is DA employed in many centralized markets, such as public school admissions and medical residency assignments, but it also has a number of desirable properties compared to decentralized matching, as we shall highlight below.
In the DA algorithm (student-proposing version), students and colleges report their ordinal preferences to the clearinghouse, which then uses the information to simulate the following multi-round procedure. In each round t = 1, ..., students apply to the most preferred colleges that have not yet rejected them. The colleges then tentatively accept the most preferred applicants up to their capacities and reject the rest (permanently). This process is repeated until no further applications are made, in which case each student is assigned to a college that has tentatively accepted the student. While the sequential nature of the mechanism resembles the "wait-listing" considered earlier, it differs in several respects: first, students apply to one college per round; second, a college's admission is tentative in each round; and third, the number of rounds is not limited. These features eliminate congestion.
To see this, consider how DA would proceed in our baseline model with only common measure v (assuming truthful reporting by agents on both sides). For concreteness, fix a realized state s such that µ A (s) > 1/2. DA takes two rounds, and Figure 4 .2 describes the set of students who apply to the two colleges and are admitted by them in each of the two rounds. In the first round, a mass µ A (s) of students apply to college A, and the remaining mass µ B (s) = 1 − µ A (s) of students apply to college B. Each college tentatively admits the top κ students among the applicant. Thus, colleges' cutoffs in this round, denoted byv i (s), satisfy µ i (s)(1 − G(v i (s))) = κ for i = A, B (see Figure 4 .2(a)). The rejected students then apply to the remaining college in the second round, and again, colleges reselect the top κ students among those admitted tentatively in the first round and the new applicants. Thus, colleges' cutoffs are readjusted to satisfy µ A (s)(1−G(v A (s))) = κ and 1−G(v B (s)) = 2κ (see Figure 4 .2(b)). Since there are no more colleges to which rejected students can apply, the algorithm terminates, and the tentative assignment becomes final. The outcome is clearly fair since a student never envies another with a lower score v, and it is also Pareto efficient.
More generally, the following results hold for our baseline model.
27
Theorem 6. DA makes truthful reporting a weakly dominant strategy for students and it makes truthful reporting of rankings (based on v) and capacities an ex post equilibrium for colleges. In the resulting equilibrium, in each state s, there are cutoffs (v A (s),v B (s)) such that each student v is assigned to the best college among those whose cutoff is below v, and the colleges fill their capacities exactly. The outcome is fair and Pareto efficient.
Proof. The dominant strategy property (or "strategy-proofness") is a well-known consequence of the DA (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) . The fairness and efficiency properties are similarly well-known (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Balinski and Sönmez, 1999; Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) . The incentive property of the colleges is due to their common ordinal preferences and is proven in Appendix A.6.
The colleges are collectively better off under DA than under decentralized matching; colleges attain their enrollment targets exactly and jointly enroll the top 2κ students. This does not mean, however, that a consensus would form in favor of centralization under DA. . Then, a decentralized matching admits a mixed equilibrium similar to that in Figure 3 .3. With the shift to the DA, the colleges' payoffs improve jointly, but college B's payoff falls. The reason is that college B now loses many good students that it was able to attract under decentralized matching.
This example may explain why centralized matching is not as common in college admissions as in other contexts, such as public high-school admissions.
28 Unlike public high 27 The outcome of college-proposing DA is the same as that of student-proposing DA in our model, since colleges have a uniform rank on students. See also Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (forthcoming) and Azevedo and Leshno (2012) for a model of DA in which a continuum of students is matched to a finite number of schools.
28 Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal and Pathak (2014) find the switch in 2002 from a decentralized matching mechanism to a centralized one based on DA resulted in a significant gain in utilitarian welfare for applicants in the New York City Public High School assignment. schools which are largely under the control of a central authority, colleges are independent strategic players with their own interests to pursue.
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Empirical Evidence
Our main thesis is that the "congestion" of decentralized matching causes colleges to avoid head-on competition, by strategically targeting students based on the common measure of merit and by overweighting the non-common measures of student merit. While conclusive evidence on the uncertainty colleges face and their strategic responses is difficult to obtain, there are some suggestive facts.
First, there is some evidence on the uncertainty facing colleges with respect to their enrollment. Indeed, the uncertainty facing colleges is a main theme characterizing recent US colleges admissions, according to NACAC (2012) as noted in footnote 5. As a simple test for the presence of aggregate uncertainty, we investigated if the yield rates for 34 US colleges varied significantly across 2011-2013 (for the classes of 2015-2017 applicants), using the data reported in NYT "The Choice" blog.
30 One could take the yield rate-the rate at which admitted students accept a college-as a proxy for the realized preference for a college for a given year (µ i (s) in our model), and its variability as a measure of uncertainty facing the college. 31 Both Fisher's exact test and a Chi-square test reject the null hypothesis that the rates are the same over three years (i.e., no aggregate uncertainty) for (the same) 15 colleges out of 34 in the sample, at the p = 0.05 significance level (see Table B .1 in Appendix B).
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Second, the admissions decisions made by Hanyang University in Korea show a pattern consistent both with the strategic targeting and the overweighting of non-common measure 29 There are other difficulties associated with centralizing college admissions particularly in the US. First, US colleges provide complicated systems of financial aids to students based on a variety of factors (see Epple, Romano and Sieg, 2006) . Second, US colleges often seek to assemble a cohesive student body, thus exhibiting so-called "complementary preferences" (see Che, Kim and Kojima, 2015) . Designing a centralized matching mechanism that accommodates these features may be difficult. Third, as we discuss in Section 6, decentralized matching may have an advantage in economizing on the costs students incur in evaluating their choices than some centralized matching algorithms. 30 We thank a referee for suggesting this test and the editor for bringing the data to our attention. See http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/category/admissions-data. 31 Given our model, the number of enrollment at college i follows B(n i , p i ), where n i is the number of students admitted by college i and p i is the probability that an admitted student accepts i's admission. The presence of aggregate uncertainty means that p i is a random variable that varies with the state of the world. Admittedly, the measure is imperfect since the choice set for admitted students differs across years. More importantly, n i is not exogenous but rather chosen by the college to combat precisely the sort of uncertainty that would result in different yield rates across years. We thus believe that the observed variability in yield rates understates the uncertainty facing a college.
32 There are 37 colleges in the data. We excluded three colleges (Harvard, Yale and Emory) from the sample since the first two schools contain missing variables and the last one had an extreme fall in yield rates, which we suspect is due to a some regime change in the way accounting is done. Note: The total score of CSAT is normalized by 280, while the actual score may depend on the subjects taken by students.
of merit identified in the paper.
33 Each department at Hanyang admits students in multiple rounds via wait-listing for its regular admissions. In the case of the Department of Economics and Finance (henceforth DEF), one of the largest departments at Hanyang, the admissions process took 8 rounds in each of 2011 and 2013, and 11 rounds in year 2012. These numbers of rounds are typical for other departments at Hanyang and reflect the magnitude of uncertainty facing the department. The composition of applicants admitted at different rounds reveals an interesting pattern. Table 1 summarizes the scores of the nationwide College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) earned by the students who were admitted by DEF at different sequential rounds in years 2011-2013. 34 For each year, the number "i = 1, ..., 4" denotes the admissions round, and "≥ 5" denotes all rounds after 5th round. The third and the fourth columns respectively present the number of admittees and their average CSAT scores in different rounds. The numbers in the fourth and the fifth columns are the average CSAT scores of the top and the bottom 10% admittees in each round, respectively. A monotone admissions strategy (i.e., cutoff strategy) would result in students admitted on earlier rounds having uniformly higher CSAT scores than those admitted in later rounds. 33 We gratefully acknowledge Hanyang University for providing their admissions data. 34 As noted in Section 4.1, for the regular admissions stage, college-department pairs in Korea are divided into three groups, called groups Ga, Na and Da, and students can apply to at most one in each group. Thus, a unit in each group competes with other units in the same group but does not face competition with units in other groups. DEF divides its quota into two groups, Ga and Na, and admits students separately for the two groups. We focus on the admissions decision on the group Ga applications, which is the primary target group of DEF. The quota assigned for group Ga is twice as many as the quota for group Na.
Notes: The horizontal axis is an admittee's CSAT score, and the vertical axis is the number of students of given score admitted in each round of admission. Consistent with Theorem 5, however, the table shows significant non-monotonicity across rounds. Observe that in each year, the average CSAT score of the top 10% students admitted in the i + 1-th round is higher than that of the bottom 10% students admitted in the i-th round. (The only exceptions are the second and the third rounds in 2013.) The exact distribution of CSAT scores earned by admittees at different rounds is presented in Figure 5 .1 for year 2013. The nonmonotonicity displayed by DEF is also seen at other departments in Hanyang. In Appendix B, we provide summaries of students' CSAT scores for the Department of Business and the Department of Mechanical Engineering, which exhibit similar non-monotonicity.
The reason for the observed non-monotonicity is that DEF offers a significant number of its admissions based on a measure that "garbles" a student's CSAT score by another measure, called "student record." Because of a legal restriction on the way the latter is complied, the CSAT score is widely regarded as a more reliable indicator of a student's academic performance compared to his/her student record.
35 Indeed, Hanyang's objective for the regular admissions is to "attract high CSAT scorers." 36 In keeping with this objective, DEF awards a small number of the so-called "priority" admissions in its first round admission based solely on applicants' CSAT scores, but for the remaining admissions in the first and the subsequent rounds, it makes selections based on the weighted sum of the student record and CSAT scores. Accordingly, the students receiving priority admissions have higher CSAT scores than all other admitted students. (Both Table 1 and Figure 5 .1 include the students receiving priority admissions as part of the first-round admittees.) However, because of the garbled selections for the remaining admissions, the students admitted in the earlier rounds need not have higher CSAT scores than those admitted in later rounds.
Conclusion
The current paper has presented a new model of decentralized college admissions. In this model, colleges face enrollment uncertainty that arises from students' aggregately uncertain preferences. We have shown that colleges respond to enrollment uncertainty by strategically targeting their admissions based on students' common measure of merit and by overweighting non-common measures of their merit in admissions, and that this equilibrium behavior leads to justified envy and Pareto inefficiency.
We have also studied other responses by colleges whereby they limit the number of a student's applications, admit students in multiple rounds via wait-listing, or centralize admissions via DA. Both restricted application and wait-listing alleviate colleges' yield control burden, but strategic targeting and enrollment uncertainty remain, leaving justified envy and inefficiency unaddressed. Centralized matching via DA achieves efficiency and eliminates enrollment uncertainty and justified envy, at least when colleges evaluate students only by a common measure. However, not all colleges necessarily benefit from such a centralized matching. This last observation may explain why college admissions remain decentralized in many countries. Our analyses have several other implications.
Early admissions. Early admissions are widely adopted by colleges in the US and Korea. Early admissions programs allow students to apply to sponsoring colleges early, and the colleges in turn process their applications prior to the regular admissions round (with binding or non-binding requirements for students to accept them early). The remaining students and seats are then allocated through regular admissions. This process resembles sequential admissions studied in Section 4.2. In addition, some early admissions programs restrict applications just as in Section 4.1. Although the model involving both sequential ad- missions and restricted application is not tractable (especially with aggregate uncertainty), our analyses imply that these features can help colleges to cope with enrollment uncertainty. We believe this is an important function of early admissions not emphasized by other recent papers (Avery and Levin, 2010; Lee, 2009) . Despite this benefit to colleges, our analyses suggest that the outcomes of these programs are unlikely to be efficient or fair.
Loyalty and legacy. It is well documented that colleges favor students who show eagerness to attend them. Students who signal their interests through campus visits, essays, letters of intention, or webcam interviews are known to be favored by colleges. According to the 2004 and 2005 NACAC Admission Trends Survey, 59% of the colleges surveyed assigned some level of importance to a student's "demonstrated interest" in their admissions decisions. Table 2 shows the extent to which certain applicant activities would be considered as a "plus factor" in the admission process by institutions with varying yield rates. Early admissions, as Avery and Levin (2010) argue, also serve as a tool for colleges to identify enthusiastic applicants and favor them in the admission. It is entirely plausible that these preferences by colleges are intrinsic, as postulated by Avery and Levin (2010) . However, our theory suggests that such a preference could also arise endogenously from the desire to manage enrollment uncertainty. Like the students without a competing offer in our model, those with demonstrated interest add less to the capacity cost, since their preference is unlikely to vary much with the popularity of the college among regular students.
37 Accordingly, even a college with no intrinsic preference for loyal students has a reason to favor 37 To see this, suppose there are two groups of students, loyal (L) and regular (R), for college A. A regular student prefers college A with probability µ(s) in state s ∈ [0, 1] as before, but a loyal student prefers A with probability µ L (s) = µ(s) + a, for some constant a > 0. That is, a higher fraction of loyal students prefer A than regular students at every state. Suppose there are two students, one loyal and one regular, and suppose both receive an offer from B. The loyal student adds to capacity cost λ whenever college A over-enrolls. This latter probability conditional on the loyal student accepting A's offer is
them. Consistent with this view, Table 2 shows that colleges suffering lower yield rates tend to favor students with "demonstrated interest" more than the colleges enjoying higher yield rates. A similar explanation applies to the favoring of legacy students (who have a family history with the school).
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Yield manipulation. Colleges in our model exhibit endogenous preference for a high yield. While such a preference arises in our model from the desire to manage enrollment uncertainty, colleges in practice may prefer a high yield rate for an intrinsic reason-favorable perception and brand image. Importantly, "yield and acceptance rates for a college's entering class account for one-fourth of the 'student selectivity' score in the influential US News & World Report annual rankings of colleges and universities, enough to raise or lower a school's position by several spots." 39 Our analysis implies that "yield-motivated" colleges will behave similarly to colleges in our model; namely, they will strategically target students overlooked by stronger colleges and reject students who are unlikely to accept their offers (or are "too good for them"). This behavior is consistent with anecdotal evidence.
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Information acquisition and evaluation costs. Often students do not have clear preferences about colleges and must incur costly efforts to rank them. There is a sense in which decentralized matching economizes on such costs better than centralization via DA. Applicants under decentralized matching (in our baseline model) need only rank colleges that admit them. By contrast, under DA, students do not know which colleges will admit them at the time of submitting their preferences, so they may end up evaluating colleges that will never admit them or not evaluating colleges that will admit them. More formally, in the context of our model, for a sufficiently low evaluation cost of ranking between A and B, a student will incur the cost only when both colleges admit the student under decentralized matching, but under DA, there exists a cutoffv such that students above the cutoff find it worthwhile to incur the cost and those below do not evaluate the colleges and rank them simply based on their prior. 41 It is unclear how important this benefit of decentralized matching is in which is strictly lower than (1 − s A )
, the corresponding probability of A over-enrolling conditional on the regular student accepting A's offer.
38 Espenshade, Chung and Walling (2004) show that legacy applicants have nearly three times the likelihood of being accepted as non-legacies.
39 "Glass Floor: Colleges Reject Top Applicants, Accepting Only the Students Likely to Enroll," by Daniel Golden, Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2001 .
40 The Wall Street Journal article cited in footnote 39 reports one such practice employed by Franklin and Marshall College: "By wait-listing top applicants who didn't visit the campus or interview with college representatives, the college bumped up its yield for the next school year to 27% from 25%. It also improved its acceptance rate -the ratio of acceptances to total applications -to a more selective 51% from 53%. Such numbers could help Franklin and Marshall rise in the US News ranking of national liberal-arts colleges from its current position of 33rd."
41 The Supplementary Notes present this result more formally.
comparison with its disadvantages recognized earlier. Moreover, restriction on application will have an "informational inefficiency" similar to that of DA, so if decentralized matching involves that feature, as has been the case in many settings, the informational advantage of decentralized matching is not clear. Most important, the informational inefficiency is not an inherent feature of centralization. If College-Proposing DA (instead of Student-Proposing DA) were run in "real time," then students need only evaluate colleges that are willing to admit them at each round, so informational efficiency can be achieved.
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Students' responses to admissions. Students' types are treated as exogenous in our model. In practice, students may influence these measures through ex ante efforts. Our theory implies that the students will have reduced incentives to raise the common measure both because the admissions decisions may be non-monotonic and because the common measure is underweighted relative to the non-common measure.
43 By contrast, overweighting of the latter measure would mean that students face excessive incentives for improving them. Proof. "If " part. We show that the strategy profile satisfying the stated conditions forms a best response. Let σ i (v, e i ; t) := tσ i (v, e i ) + (1 − t)σ i (v, e i ) for t ∈ [0, 1], whereσ i (v, e i ) is an arbitrary strategy, andŝ i (t) be the cutoff state in equilibrium for given σ i (v, e i ; t). Let
Observe that V (t) is concave in t, since σ i (v, e i ; t) is linear in t and π i (σ i ) is concave in σ i . We have
; and H i (v, e i , σ j (v)) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, we have
where the first inequality holds since V is concave and the last follows from (A.1). Sinceσ i is arbitrary, this proves that σ i is a best response to σ j .
"Only if " part. We show that any equilibrium strategy profile must satisfy the stated conditions. Let
Suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium, either σ i (v, e i ) < 1 for (v, e i ) ∈ U + or σ i (v, e i ) > 0 for (v, e i ) ∈ U − (or both). Consider a strategyσ i , whereσ i (v, e i ) = 1 for every (v, e i ) ∈ U + , σ i (v, e i ) = 0 for every (v, e i ) ∈ U − , andσ i (v, e i ) = σ i (v, e i ) for all other (v, e i )'s. Now, define σ i (v, e i ; t) := tσ i (v, e i ) + (1 − t)σ i (v, e i ) for t ∈ [0, 1] and V (t) similar as above. Observe that
where the inequality holds since H i (v, e i , σ j (v)) > 0 for (v, e i ) ∈ U + and H i (v, e i , σ j (v)) < 0 for (v, e i ) ∈ U − . Thus, for sufficiently small t > 0, a deviation strategy σ i (·, ·; t) is profitable.
We thus have a contradiction.
Proof. Suppose for any x ∈ [0, 1),
where the first inequality holds since x > x and u i > u i , and the second inequality holds since
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Observe that for any interior value ofê i (v), we must have
Together with the fact thatê j (v) has an interior value (since it is strictly decreasing in v), this implies that
where µ i = E[µ i (s)] and the inequality follows from the facts thatê j (v) < 0 and
> 0, by the implicit function theorem,
where the inequality follows from (A.2).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1. There exists a mixing equilibrium described in the theorem.
Proof. We shall identify a mixing equilibrium in terms of the threshold statesŝ := (ŝ A ,ŝ B ). To begin, fix any candidate threshold statesŝ := (ŝ A ,ŝ B ). We construct the cutoffs (ê A ,ê B ) associated with a mixing equilibrium givenŝ, as follows. 
, where Ψ i (ŝ) := arg min s |m i (s;ŝ) − κ| . This map is well defined since m i (·;ŝ) is continuous and strictly monotone (strictly increasing for i = A and decreasing for i = B). We now show that Ψ is continuous, which would imply the existence of a fixed point by Brouwer's fixed point theorem. Note that given a fixed pointŝ * = Ψ(ŝ * ), the profile (ê A (v;ŝ * ),ê B (v;ŝ * )) satisfies the conditions in Lemma 2, proving that (ê A (v;ŝ * ),ê B (v;ŝ * ))
forms an equilibrium, which is mixed by construction. To prove continuity of Ψ, fixŝ = (ŝ A ,ŝ B ) andŝ = (ŝ A ,ŝ B ) =ŝ, and let Ψ(ŝ) =s and Ψ(ŝ ) =s . Note
It is routine to show that asŝ →ŝ,ê
, implying that the first term vanishes. Furthermore, for i = A, B, u i → u i and u i → u i , asŝ →ŝ, where u i and u i are i's upper and lower cutoffs givenŝ and u i and u i are the i's respective cutoffs givenŝ . This means that the measure of [0, 1] \ V 0 vanishes asŝ →ŝ. Combining these observations, we conclude that |m i (s;ŝ ) − m i (s;ŝ)| vanishes asŝ →ŝ. We have thus shown that m i (s;ŝ) is continuous isŝ. By the theorem of maxima and the fact that arg min s |m i (s;ŝ) − κ| is unique, Ψ is continuous.
To show the last part, we parametrize the degree of symmetry by ε > 0 as follows: For each ε > 0, we assume µ i (s; ε) ∈ (1 − µ i (1 − s; ε) − ε, 1 − µ i (1 − s; ε) + ε) for i = A, B. Let Ψ(·, ε) be the map defined in Step 1 that is associated with ε. Let S(ε) be the set of fixed points of Ψ(·; ε), and let
be the set of lower and upper cutoffs for the colleges in all equilibria. Let ε = 0 be the limiting case in which the two colleges are exactly symmetric (i.e., µ i (s; 0) = 1 − µ i (1 − s; 0)), and let S(0) and V (0) denote the corresponding sets for that case.
Step 2. For sufficiently small ε > 0, max i=A,
Proof. We first note that at ε = 0, the result holds.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary min i=A,B u i < max i=A,B u i . Let u B < u B ≤ u A < u A , without loss of generality. Note that u A ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium, since if u A = 1, then m A (s) = 0 for all s; and if u A = 0, then u i = u i = 0 for all i = A, B, so U A ∪ U B has measure one. Both contradict Lemma 1. We thus have
Using those, we have
, where the first equality follows from the definition of µ B and the last equality follows from the symmetry of µ A . Since µ A (s) is strictly increasing in s, it holds thatŝ B > 1 −ŝ A , and so u B = λŝ B > λ(1 −ŝ A ) = u A , which yields a contradiction.
Next, we show that the correspondence V (ε) is upper hemicontinuous in ε at ε = 0. To see this, take any sequence {ε n } n with ε n → 0, such that the corresponding thresholdsŝ n ∈ S(ε n ) converge to someŝ * . 44 Since (u i (ŝ), u i (ŝ)) is continuous inŝ, for i = A, B, the associated lower and upper cutoffs (u
where the second equality holds sinceŝ n is a fixed point of Ψ, and the last follows from the continuity of Ψ. This proves thatŝ * ∈ S(0). Since (u i (ŝ), u i (ŝ)) is continuous inŝ, for 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Assume (3.2). The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. There exists an equilibrium, and in any equilibrium, there exists a unique cutoff profile (ê *
Proof. To this end, we first establish the following result. Proof. Fix any candidate threshold statesŝ = (ŝ A ,ŝ B ). Theorem 1 characterizes the cutoffs (ê A (v;ŝ),ê B (v;ŝ)) for each v. The characterization can be seen as identifying an intersection of two "best response correspondences," defined for i = A, B by
44 Such a sequence is well defined since the correspondence S(·) lies in a compact set.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose to the contrary that there is a symmetric equilibrium in which colleges A and B admit all acceptable students with v >ṽ, whereṽ satisfies s a (1 − ε)(1 − G(ṽ)) = κ and (1 − s b )(1 − ε)(1 − G(ṽ)) = κ, and wait-list the remaining students. College C will then offer admissions to students whose scores are aboveṽ, knowing that exactly measure ε 2 of them will accept its offer. Suppose it also offers κ − ε 2 admissions to students with v ∈ [v,ṽ), wherev is such that G(ṽ) − G(v) = κ − ε 2 . This is indeed its equilibrium behavior since all these students will accept C's offer. To see this, consider any student in [v,ṽ) . If such a student accepts C's offer, then the student will get u for sure, but if the student turns down C's offer, then he will at best receive an offer with probability 1 − ε from the less popular one between A and B and earn a payoff of at most u. Since u > (1 − ε)u, the student will accept C.
We consider college A's payoff in this equilibrium. Since there are seats left in the less popular state, it fills those vacant seats with students in [v,v) and gets payoff Clearly, students in [ṽ − δ ,ṽ) accept A's offer, so A fills its capacity in the popular state:
Hence, A's payoff under the deviation, denoted by π where the second equality follows from (A.5) and the inequality holds since s a > s b . Thus,
where the second equality follows from integration by parts and after some rearrangement, and the last equality follows from (A.5), (A.7) and the fact that s a + s b = 1. Thus, for sufficiently small δ and δ , we have π 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
We show that it is an ex post equilibrium for colleges to report their rankings and capacities truthfully. Recall that when both colleges report truthfully up to their capacity, they achieve jointly optimal matching. Suppose A unilaterally deviates by either reporting its preferences or capacity untruthfully and is strictly better off at some state. Then, B must be strictly worse off. Hence, there must be a positive measure of students whom A obtains from the deviation which it prefers to some students it had before. At the same time, it must be the case that either B gets a positive measure of students who are worse than the former set of students or it has some unfilled seats left. Note that the students who are assigned to A after the deviation must prefer B, or else the original matching would not be stable. But then since B prefers each of those students to some students it has in the new matching, this means that the new matching is not stable (given the stated preferences). 
B.2 Admissions from Hanyang University
We provide summaries of students' CSAT scores for the Department of Business (DoB) and the Department of Mechanical Engineering (DME) in Hanyang. Table B .2 shows that for DoB, the average scores of the top 10% admittees in the i + 1-th round is higher than that of the bottom 10% in the ith round for each year and for all rounds. Table B .3 for DME exhibits a similar nonmonotonicity from the first to third rounds for each year. 
